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INTRODUCTION
Recent economic developments have transformed 
rural Tibet1 in significant and sometimes unanticipated 
ways. Although some critics allege that China’s 
development initiatives do not benefit rural Tibetans, 
or do so only marginally, we present evidence that 
many Tibetans are successfully adapting to rapid 
changes induced by government policies. This paper 
documents the rise of rural entrepreneurs in Tibet and 
the increasing scale and diversity of their economic 
endeavors. Herein, we define an entrepreneur as 
a person who organizes and manages a business 
undertaking, assuming risk in a quest for profit. In 
order to qualify as an entrepreneur, one must engage 
in economic activities that require capital investment 
and entail a degree of financial risk.
The upsurge of entrepreneurial activities in rural 
Tibet may seem counterintuitive given the bleak 
picture painted by some studies. For example, 
Fischer points out that Tibetan migrants to cities must 
compete for jobs on an uneven playing field against 
higher skilled in-migrants from other areas of China 
(2005:132-133, see also Fischer this volume and 
Yeh and Henderson 2008), an observation echoed 
by Wang (2009) who notes how China’s “Open 
1.“Tibet” in this paper refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region, 
which corresponds roughly to the territory ruled by the Dalai Lama 
at the time that it was incorporated into the PRC in 1951.
Policy” on in-migration has encouraged people from 
other regions to establish small businesses in Tibet. 
In urban areas, competition from non-Tibetans who 
have more education and experience places Tibetans 
at a disadvantage when it comes to starting successful 
businesses. As a consequence, many niches for 
entrepreneurial activities are filled before Tibetans 
have even acquired the skills or capital to enter into 
competition (Wang 2009:14). Although Fischer and 
Wang shed an important spotlight on inter-ethnic 
economic competition in cities, the urban focus of 
their studies does not inform us of developments 
in the rural countryside where the overwhelming 
majority of Tibetans continue to live—a void in 
research that this paper seeks to redress.
In this paper we describe economic developments 
in our rural Tibetan fieldwork sites, and then 
present case studies to show how some Tibetans are 
capitalizing on new economic opportunities that stem 
both directly and indirectly from the government’s 
development policies. We conclude by discussing the 
potential that entrepreneurs have for changing the 
social and economic landscape of rural Tibet.
RESEARCH SITES AND METHODS
Between 2006 and 2009, we conducted four 
stints of fieldwork for a total of approximately nine 
months in three villages in Tibet’s Shigatse Prefecture 
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This paper documents the rise of entrepreneurs in rural Tibet, a process that started in the 1980s and gained 
considerable momentum in the wake of China’s Develop the West Campaign launched in 2000. The authors 
describe economic transformations in rural Tibet from 1959 to the present, and present case studies of 
entrepreneurs to show how some Tibetans are capitalizing on new economic opportunities that stem both 
directly and indirectly from government development policies. Whereas many critics allege that China’s 
development initiatives benefit rural Tibetans only marginally, today’s rural entrepreneurs illustrate how some 
Tibetans are successfully negotiating the new matrix of opportunities. However, because Tibet’s economy is 
highly dependent on government investments, it is unclear whether the increase in entrepreneurial activities 
is sustainable over the long-term. Nevertheless, the case studies demonstrate several entrepreneurial 
pathways to upward mobility that are currently available, including farm-based initiatives, construction 
contracting, cottage industry, and retail business.
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main unit of production and consumption was the corporate 
family, named family entities that existed across generations. 
Their main strategy for increasing their wealth and power 
was to concentrate male labor in the family and prevent 
the fragmentation of their family’s landholding through the 
marital practice of fraternal polyandry (see Goldstein 1971).
Manorial estates in Tibet ended after the failed 1959 revolt, 
and these villages became part of a new socialist political and 
economic system. A few years later, the state forcibly organized 
all villages and families into agricultural communes.  Farm 
work was now organized by a small number of commune 
managers. Family members worked at tasks assigned by the 
managers so families were no longer units of production as 
they had no land of their own. Fraternal polyandry was no 
longer practiced, and in fact was banned by the government. 
Although meant to improve agricultural production, the 
commune system worked poorly. In conjunction with the 
ideological excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the system 
impoverished the rural population and even led to a series 
of revolts in 1969 (see Goldstein, Jiao, and Lhudrup 2009). 
The next major change occurred in 1978-79 when Deng 
Xiaoping came to power, eliminated communes, implemented 
market economics and valorized the profit motive. In Tibet, 
communes were dissolved in 1980-81 and were replaced by 
the “Household Responsibility System” which again allowed 
families to function as units of production and consumption. 
The government distributed all commune land to its members 
on a per capita basis so that every person alive at the date of 
redistribution received one equal share as a long-term lease. 
A household consisting of seven members thereby received 
seven shares of land. The traditional Tibetan corporate family 
ideal quickly reemerged along with a revival of fraternal 
polyandry (Jiao 2001; Goldstein et al. 2002; Fjeld 2006). 
Keeping landholdings intact across generations was again a 
major objective because a family’s land was given as a long-
term lease from the state and could not be bought or sold. 
Therefore, there was no way to replace land that would be lost 
if a son married out of the household and claimed his rightful 
share (Goldstein et al. 2002).
The Household Responsibility System led to immediate 
improvements in the standard of living (Goldstein et. al. 
2003), but several factors since 1982 have steadily eroded 
families’ landholdings both in absolute and per capita terms. 
These included the natural increase of the population due to 
births exceeding deaths, the government’s practice of using 
eminent domain to claim agricultural land for development 
projects, the loss of land through flooding and other forces 
of nature, and the use by families of some of their farmland 
for constructing new houses. Between 1982 and 1997 the 
amount of land per capita declined by 32 percent in Sogang 
and 33 percent in Norgyong.3
The new corporate families compensated for this, as 
3. These figures were derived from Goldstein, Jiao, Beall and Tsering’s 
1998 survey, and do not include Betsag because that village was not 
included in the 1998 survey.
to investigate the impact of modernization on rural families. 
The three villages, while not selected to represent all of Tibet, 
lie within a major agricultural corridor running between 
Tibet’s two largest cities, Lhasa and Shigatse, which contains 
about 30 per cent of Tibet’s population. They were selected 
to meet a research design comparing a continuum of villages 
from relatively wealthy to relatively poor (more to less affected 
by modernization). Two of these villages were also part of 
an earlier study by Goldstein and colleagues (Goldstein 
et al. 2003). Sogang, the least affected by development, is 
located in Panam County in the upper (mountainous) part 
of a tributary river valley, while Norgyong, the intermediate 
site, is situated below Sogang on the main river. Norgyong is 
located immediately beside the county seat in Panam. Betsag, 
the third site, is located only 10 kilometers from Shigatse 
City and was included to represent a wealthy farming village 
that is more heavily affected by mechanized agriculture and 
government development programs. Despite these economic 
differences, the three villages are geographically close and are 
part of the same Tibetan sub-ethnic cultural and linguistic 
zone. Table 1 provides some basic demographic details about 
the villages.
Village Households Population
Mean 
house-
hold size
Mean income 
per household 
(2005)
Sogang 92 665 7.2 10,332¥
Norgyong 124 853 6.9 24,112¥
Betsag 93 712 7.7 35,759¥
Table 1: Summary of Fieldwork Sites, 2006. Note: At the time of our 
fieldwork in 2006-2009 the average exchange rate was 7.5¥ to $1.00. Source: 
Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui 2008.
The primary focus of our research on intergenerational 
relations and the shifting status of the elderly necessitated 
that we document the enormous changes sweeping rural 
Tibet in the wake of China’s push to modernize the economy. 
As a component of this research, we interviewed over 50 
individuals who earn income through non-farm employment. 
The data presented in this paper are drawn from those in-
depth interviews.2
The villages and families we studied have undergone 
several major socio-economic transformations over the 
past six decades. Traditionally, the families were part of the 
Tibetan manorial estate system and thereby were hereditarily 
bound to estates and lords. There were important differences 
within villages; some families were landless while others 
held hereditary usufruct rights to agricultural land from 
their lords and estates. Families with land farmed for their 
subsistence, and in return incurred a heavy tax burden in 
farm produce, corveé labor, and other obligations. Their 
2. For further details on these village see Goldstein, Childs, and 
Wangdui (2008, 2010) and Childs, Goldstein, and Wangdui (2011).
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well as for rising inflation and a shift of some expenses 
such as health care from the state to the family, by sending 
household members outside the village in search of wage-
labor opportunities. By 1997, rural Tibetans in sizable 
numbers were seeking to supplement household incomes by 
engaging in non-farm economic opportunities. Specifically, in 
1997 nearly 50 percent of rural households in our sample 
had at least one member engaged in non-farm labor for part 
of the year, and the number could have been higher had 
there not been a dearth of jobs in the construction industry 
which many Tibetans blamed on the influx of non-Tibetan 
migrant workers (Goldstein et al. 2003). Moreover, private 
entrepreneurs began to emerge albeit their numbers and 
ambitions were modest compared to the present. 
Economic opportunities for Tibetans increased dramatically 
in the wake of China’s Develop the West Campaign (Ch. xibu 
da kaifa). Launched in 2000, the campaign aimed to redress 
the widening gap between China’s relatively wealthy east 
and comparatively poor west, including Tibet, by infusing 
billions of dollars into development projects.4 In Tibet the 
government directed most initial expenditures toward large 
infra-structure projects such as highways, buildings, and the 
railway to Lhasa. At the commencement of the Develop the 
West Campaign, private enterprises in rural Tibet were either 
too small-scale to be noticed in official economic statistics, 
or virtually nonexistent. In 2001, state-owned units in Tibet 
were the source of 95 percent of investments in fixed assets for 
the region, and as Fischer notes, “very little formal investment 
takes place in the rural areas between the micro investments 
by households and the large-scale projects of the state sector” 
(2005:71-72).
A “People First” (Ch. yiren weiben; Tib. mi rtsa bar ’dzin) 
dimension was added to the Develop the West Campaign 
in 2006 to place more emphasis on social improvements 
and provide farmers with market opportunities for rural 
products.5 The centerpiece of the People First initiative, called 
the “Comfortable Housing Program” (Ch. anju gongcheng; 
Tib. bde sdod rnam grangs), aimed between 2006 and 2010 
to provide direct subsidies to 80 percent of Tibet’s rural 
households so they could upgrade the quality of their houses.6 
4. For general discussions of this campaign, see Lai (2002), Goodman 
(2004), and Holbig (2004).
5. Additionally, the Panam Integrated Rural Development Project 
(PIRDP) was undertaken in our research area between 2001 and 2005 as a 
collaboration between the European Union and the government of China. 
The government chose Panam County (where Sogang and Norgyong are 
located), Gyantse County, and Shigatse City (which includes Betsag) as 
“model areas for modernizing agriculture in Tibet” (Kaiser and Dui 2005). 
One impact in Betsag was the cross-breeding of hybrid cows with local 
animals to improve milk production. 
6. Reports from Human Rights Watch (2006) and Robin (2009) 
allege that the government forces Tibetans to participate in the Comfortable 
Housing Program, compels them to build houses that are incompatible 
with traditional lifestyles, and impoverishes Tibetans by causing massive 
indebtedness. To the contrary, our own research shows that participation is 
voluntary, housing design is flexible, people are confident of their ability to 
repay loans, and most have positive opinions about the program (Goldstein, 
Childs, and Wangdui 2010). The reports by Human Rights Watch and 
Although the subsidies ranging from 8,000¥ to 12,000¥ only 
covered 15-20 percent of the cost to rebuild, the program’s 
popularity across the Tibetan Plateau led to a high demand for 
skilled labor as thousands of families began to rebuild their 
houses. Nearly half the 330 households in our three research 
villages participated during the program’s first four years 
(Goldstein, Childs, and Wangdui 2010). 
Massive expenditures associated with the Develop the 
West Campaign further stimulated the emerging wage-labor 
market in Tibet. By 2005 over 90 percent of households in 
our research villages had at least one income earner, and 
over half had two or more (Goldstein, Childs, and Wangdui 
2008). Table 2 provides a perspective on the emphasis rural 
Tibetans now place on non-farm labor as a component of 
their household economic strategy. Note the large increases 
in the percentages of males and females aged 20-39 who earn 
incomes.
Village Age
Males Females
1997 2005 1997 2005
Sogang
20-29 18.0 69.2 7.4 31.9
30-39 25.5 71.7 2.1 16.7
Norgyong
20-29 28.4 63.7 2.5 28.0
30-39 29.3 63.5 6.8 28.3
Betsag
20-29 63.3 13.6
30-39 70.8 22.0
Table 2: Percent Earning Income by Age Category and Village. Source: 
Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui 2008.
Such a large increase in off-farm labor opportunities 
is typically associated with a shift from farming to urban-
based economic activities. Fischer (this volume) reports that, 
according to official statistics, the proportion of the labor 
force engaged in farming and herding has declined from 76 
percent in 1999 to 56 percent in 2008, thereby suggesting 
a rapid decline of the rural farm sector is underway. While 
there has certainly been permanent migration from our study 
villages to urban areas, we find that going outside the village 
to earn cash income does not necessitate abandoning the rural 
sector and the farm economy. In Tibetan corporate families, 
the head of the household assigns tasks to its members, and 
one such task is to go outside the village to earn income.7 
For example, a person might leave home after the New Year 
holiday and spend the next seven months working elsewhere, 
then return to help with the autumn harvest and remain at 
home through the following New Year. Afterwards, he might 
go to a city to seek seasonal employment, or find work on a 
construction project in the countryside, or even stay home 
Robin were based on information gathered from afar, whereas our report 
was based on in situ research that included extensive interviews with 
project participants and local government officials.
7. This is not a new practice. In the traditional society richer 
households often sent a son with the family’s team of donkeys or mules to 
earn income by transporting goods to and from India. Such individuals 
would stay outside the village for months at a time, similar to migrant 
laborers today.
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make their way to urban areas on a permanent basis, leaving 
the old and infirm behind as is found in many parts of the 
world. While some people have left permanently, our study 
villages which are close to Tibet’s second largest city, Shigatse, 
remain vibrant centers of social and economic activity.
The above 
discussion of of-
ficial statistics and 
their implications 
is important given 
the context of this 
paper’s focus on 
rural entrepre-
neurs. If a major 
shift from rural 
to urban employ-
ment is underway, 
and if the majority 
of entrepreneurial 
opportunities are 
concentrated in 
cities, then aspir-
ing Tibetan en-
trepreneurs will 
face considerable 
obstacles due to 
competition from 
non-Tibetan mi-
grants who tend to 
be more educated, have access to more capital, and possess 
a better understanding of how to navigate China’s business 
bureaucracy. But if the countryside remains a vibrant compo-
nent of Tibet’s economy, and if the countryside remains pre-
dominantly Tibetan, then rural entrepreneurs will operate on 
a more level playing field that enhances their chances for suc-
cess. The case studies that follow document ways that some 
rural Tibetans are negotiating today’s matrix of opportunities.
FARM-BASED INITIATIVES IN RURAL TIBET
Raising Animals for the Urban Meat Market
In 2006, as part of the People First initiative, China 
launched scores of programs across Tibet to encourage 
farmers to raise animals for urban meat markets (Goldstein, 
Childs, and Wangdui 2010). Before this program, however, 
some Tibetans had already started enterprises to raise animals 
for profit. For example, when Pasang8 returned to his village 
in the 1980s after military service, he purchased a horse and 
cart to collect recyclable materials such as scrap iron and 
bottles for resale. Although this modest enterprise earned 
him a decent livelihood, Pasang faced increasing competition 
from non-Tibetan migrants who nowadays dominate the rural 
recycling market.  He decided to try something different, 
8. All names used in this paper are pseudonyms.
and have another family member go outside the village to 
earn income that year.
Based on our household surveys, first-hand observations, 
and in-depth interviews with seasonal laborers, we suggest 
that statistics on the decline of rural labor, such as those cited 
above, are mis-
leading. In our 
sample the ma-
jority of migrant 
laborers were not 
even working in 
urban areas. More 
important, most 
did not move full-
time but remained 
members of their 
village households 
in both adminis-
trative terms (as 
recorded in resi-
dence documents) 
and practical 
terms (they remit-
ted earnings to the 
household head, 
retained full rights 
to their share of 
the family’s land, 
and were often co-
husbands in a polyandrous marriage). They saw themselves 
and were seen by their families as integral parts of their rural 
households. Our findings are supported by survey research 
conducted among migrant laborers in 2005 that found the 
vast majority of migrant laborers in Lhasa (78.8 percent) 
planned to return home (Ma and Lhundup 2008).
One problem with China’s labor statistics is that people 
are frequently classified as non-farm or urban laborers when 
they are actually firmly rooted in the village and the cash 
they earn is part of their farm household’s overall income. It 
is well-known that government officials have a tendency to 
skew statistics to fit certain agendas. On one hand, the TAR 
government wants to show progress with Tibet’s urbanization, 
a statistic used throughout China as a marker of development 
and modernization (see Yeh and Henderson 2008). On the 
other hand, classifying more people as urban laborers allows 
urban areas to receive greater amounts of funding for services. 
The shift implied by government statistics is, to a consider-
able extent, an artifact of misclassifying seasonal rural migrant 
laborers as urban workers. Consequently, the tremendous in-
crease in the numbers of villagers going outside to earn in-
come does not imply a parallel shift in population from rural 
to urban areas as government statistics suggest. Supporting 
evidence comes from our research on rural households over 
many years. We find that the Tibetan countryside is not typi-
fied by a large number of young people leaving villages to 
Rural Tibetans favor mechanized farming nowadays because it frees them to pursue income 
generating opportunities outside the village. Photo: Geoff Childs
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I felt that Tibet was developing, that the 
population was growing quickly, and that 
there was a shortage of meat in the market. I 
recognized there would be a market, so I started 
feeding pigs and sheep [in 1991]. . . . Meat 
prices were rising quickly, so I took a chance.
 
More recently, Pasang capitalized on a program to increase 
the size of local sheep by cross-breeding them with animals 
from Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Because he could speak 
Chinese, a skill acquired during his military service, Pasang 
was selected as a local representative. He invested several 
thousand yuan to purchase imported sheep, and also started 
raising pigs for slaughter. 
 Pasang sells 20-30 pigs and 40-50 sheep annually, 
and keeps 20-30 pigs and 50-60 sheep on hand to increase 
herd sizes for the subsequent year. He prefers to sell sheep 
from April to August, prior to the time when nomads drive 
prices down by inundating the market with their animals. 
Pasang’s buyers are Hui butchers from Shigatse who pay 
up to 300¥ for his sheep—considerably more than the 
usual price of 100¥ for local sheep. After accounting for his 
original purchase price and the cost of rearing each animal, he 
estimates a net profit of 150¥ per sheep. In addition, he sells 
the wool locally and some of the dung as fertilizer to nearby 
greenhouses. Pasang then replenishes his herd by purchasing 
animals from nomads when they descend from the highlands.
Pigs require a shorter time to fatten, so Pasang considers 
raising them to be more lucrative than sheep. He grows some 
pig fodder (beans) on his own land, purchases some fodder 
from the market, and obtains some by exchanging entrails 
for restaurant leftovers in a nearby town. Because Pasang’s 
sows are renowned for their size and quality, he is able to 
supplement his income by selling piglets locally at a price of 
135-160¥ per head. He feeds boars for one year and sows for 
two years before selling them for slaughter; his largest pigs 
sell for 1,400¥. 
Although many farmers and herders throughout Tibet 
raise and sell some of their animals for profit, most do so 
as a minor extension of their mainstay farming and herding 
activities. We consider Pasang to be an entrepreneur because 
his business depends on raising capital through bank loans or 
by re-investing profits from sales, and because he takes risks 
in the pursuit of profits. Pasang estimates his net income from 
the animal rearing enterprise to be roughly 30,000¥ per year. 
This elevates his household’s net income to 36,002¥, which 
is considerably higher than Norgyong’s average of 24,112¥. 
A Rural Cheese Production Facility
In 2001 an EU-sponsored project introduced a breed 
of cows to villages near Shigatse that produces more milk 
than local bovines. Khangchen, a household in Betsag, took 
advantage of the milk surplus produced by the new cows by 
starting a small cheese production facility. Initially, the family 
received a 4,000¥ grant from the government and sold their 
cheese in the Shigatse market. Khangchen’s cheese became 
so popular that people started coming to their house to 
buy it, prompting a need to expand production which the 
Shigatse city government facilitated through a 13,000¥ grant. 
According to the head of the Khangchen household, the local 
township and city governments supported their enterprise 
in an effort to promote his family as an exemplar for how a 
rural household can become wealthy. The facility currently 
employs three people from poor households and sells most 
of their product at a store the family owns in Shigatse. A few 
other local facilities produce a similar style of cheese, but 
Khangchen cheese has achieved such fame that, “Until our 
cheese is sold out, nobody else can sell their cheese.” 
Khangchen’s net profit from cheese production in 2005 
was 52,000¥. This brought their net income for that year 
to 61,138¥, considerably higher than Betsag’s average of 
35,759¥. Recently, the family expanded their marketing to 
Lhasa by participating in government-sponsored trade fairs. 
In 2007 they were negotiating with a major department store 
to provide them with another urban sales outlet. The family 
plans to build a new facility that is double in size and employs 
10-15 workers, and is trying to get a registered trade-mark for 
their product.
Bricks for Construction
The rapid expansion of cities and towns is providing many 
rural households with a new entrepreneurial opportunity: 
using their land to make mud bricks for building construction. 
Production is a simple process. Betsag became a center for 
brick production because it lies adjacent to a main road and is 
only ten kilometers from the center of Shigatse. After flooding 
a section of a field, workers mix mud together with straw, 
then transfer it into wooden moulds placed in the open air to 
dry. Finished bricks are stacked beside a road in preparation 
for transport to a construction site. Much of Betsag’s original 
brick production used soil excavated from marginal, non-
irrigated fields. In recent years, however, villagers began using 
dirt from prime agricultural land.
Ngödrup, an industrious man in his late forties, was a 
forerunner for this local industry. He recalls,
In 1996 I owned a car, but had an accident and 
broke many bones. I owed the bank 30,000¥. 
Everyone knew I was a driver, and that I couldn’t 
do manual labor, and the township government 
knew I was in debt. So they gave me some empty 
land. A township official said, “If you work hard 
at making bricks you can repay the debt.” I 
had no other choice, so my wife and I started 
making bricks. We sold the bricks, covered our 
daily expenses, saved, borrowed, and bought a 
tractor. I then saved money to hire others [to 
make the bricks] and began to transport the 
bricks to Shigatse. In two years I cleared the 
debt. Last year I borrowed 28,000¥ from the 
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A skilled worker can increase his income by taking on 
apprentices. For example, Tsering makes a good living as a 
house painter which involves painting elaborate designs on 
beams, pillars, window frames, and molding. Since 2003 
Tsering has found work in Kongpo where he travels with 
a crew that includes four apprentices. Completing a house 
interior in 20 days nets Tsering a profit of 2,500¥, which is 
considerably more than the 1,200¥ maximum he would earn 
at a daily wage of 60¥. The key for Tsering is securing sub-
contracts on house construction projects, and minimizing his 
labor cost by bringing apprentices whom he trains in lieu of 
payment. Because his reputation as an independent contractor 
is now secure in Kongpo, Tsering envisions boosting his 
future workload and profits by taking on more apprentices 
and paying regular salaries to some of his graduates. His 
activities are entrepreneurial in that he requires capital to 
purchase painting supplies and to feed and house his crew, 
and assumes the risk of being unable to find enough work to 
cover costs.
The amount of work Tsering is able to find as a house 
painter is directly related to the construction boom fueled 
by the Comfortable Housing Project. The sheer volume of 
construction has facilitated the rise of many skilled workers 
who seek contracts to build entire houses rather than settling 
for daily wages to complete specific tasks. Typically, these 
men start as carpenters or masons who are exposed to a range 
of activities that teach them how to manage constructing an 
entire building: how to formulate a budget, deal with clients, 
recruit workers, manage a workforce, purchase materials, 
and secure transportation for materials and crew to the work 
site. For example, Tenzin is an enterprising young man from 
Sogang who completed his apprenticeship as a carpenter in 
2004. In 2007 his teacher secured a contract to build 60 
houses. Tenzin asked for and received a sub-contract to build 
two of the houses on his own. At the time of our interview, 
he was recruiting a labor force that included 30 skilled and 
unskilled workers from the area around his village. Tenzin 
expects to make a profit of 15,000¥ from his sub-contract, a 
substantial increase over the daily wages he could earn as a 
carpenter.
Gyaltsen, a mason, received his first contract from 
villagers who recognized his intelligence and high skill level. 
He explained the process,
First you negotiate a price, and then make a 
contract. The contract is only between the house 
owner and the contractor; there are no offices 
involved. It is a written contract with thumb 
prints. The house owners are Tibetan, so the 
contracts are written in Tibetan. Two copies are 
made and signed by both people. Each keeps a 
copy. If you have to go to court, the signatures 
are on the paper.
The size of the contract is based on the 
square meters of the house. The cost is 90¥ 
bank. I bought another small tractor, and with 
the remainder paid the workers. I sold bricks 
worth 40,000¥, which gave me a net profit of 
16,000¥. 
Today, Betsag’s major brick producers employ workers 
from other villages. A team of two can produce 700-800 
bricks in a single day, and are paid 0.15¥ per brick. Hiring 
external labor frees Betsag’s entrepreneurs to transport the 
bricks to construction sites where they fetch a higher price.
By 2007 seven households in Betsag received the bulk of 
their annual income through brick production. Brick-making 
has emerged as an entrepreneurial activity for those who 
assume economic risk by hiring labor and purchasing tractors 
to transport the finished product to markets. Betsag’s brick 
production industry is similar to practices elsewhere in the 
world. For example, a study in Mexico found many peasants 
are boosting household incomes by excavating aggregates 
from agricultural land for use as construction materials 
(Fry 2008). However, Fry notes that very little research has 
been done on potential environmental impacts of artisanal 
quarrying. In the context of rural Tibet, the practice raises a 
question: is the quest for short-term profits compromising the 
long-term productivity of agricultural land?
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
From Wage Laborer to Contractor
The enormous resources pouring into Tibet through 
the Develop the West Campaign have given rise to new off-
farm labor opportunities. Many Tibetan’s first exposure to 
the construction industry is at the lowest level, as manual 
laborers. However, people can make more money as 
carpenters, masons, and painters. In 2006 the daily wage for 
a manual laborer at a construction site was 20-25¥ per day. 
In contrast, daily wages for skilled laborers ranged from 35-
60¥ per day. Given the wage differential, it is not surprising 
that many parents are now seeking apprenticeships for their 
teenage sons. Although up-scaling job skills to improve one’s 
earning capacity is not an entrepreneurial activity, it can 
become a route toward independent contracting which is an 
entrepreneurial activity. 
The apprenticeship period for carpenters, masons, and 
painters lasts from one to three years. Typically, parents 
arrange for a son to be tutored by a relative. According to 
one apprentice, “It is like a marriage proposal [slong chang]. 
You bring tea and barley beer to the teacher and clothing for 
every person in his household. You formally request to be 
his student.” During the apprenticeship the student receives 
no salary. In exchange for learning skills, he does menial 
tasks like sharpening tools, and prepares food and tea for his 
teacher. Once the teacher determines his pupil has acquired 
the requisite skills, the student gives parting gifts and serves 
his teacher beer in a formal ceremony. Afterwards, he is free 
to either remain with the teacher as a salaried employee, or 
find work on his own. 
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per square meter for a mud brick house, and 
120¥ for a stone brick house. If the owner is 
not so smart, then I make the house design. 
If the owner is intelligent, then he makes the 
house design. The owner of the house then 
gives me money for expenses [materials, labor, 
cigarettes, and food]—but not all the money. 
After the house is complete the owner pays the 
balance except for 3,000¥. I get that after three 
years. The contract extends for three years. If 
the house falls apart or is damaged within that 
period I must rebuild it. 
Gyaltsen recently earned a profit of 6,000¥ for building 
a house. Had he worked as a salaried mason he would have 
earned less than 2,000¥. He has become a rural entrepreneur 
by securing operating capital, establishing legally-binding 
contracts, and taking financial risks in the hope of earning far 
more than he could by merely selling his labor.
Tractors, Trucks, and Upward Mobility
Villagers in our research area envision vehicle ownership 
as a potential route to upward mobility. In a survey we asked 
heads of households, “What is the best way to get rich?” More 
than a third of Betsag’s respondents answered, “buy a truck”. 
This is a relatively recent phenomenon because private 
vehicle ownership was prohibited during the collective 
period from the 1960s to 1982. In 1984 the government 
began encouraging people to buy tractors so that they could 
earn money. Migmar was reluctant to participate in such a 
program, but was pressured to do so by township officials:
I was a village leader, so I had almost no choice . . 
. The government paid all of our transportation, 
food, and lodging expenses to Golmud [Qinghai 
Province where they collected the tractors]. 
Then we drove the tractors home.
Migmar did not regret the decision. Within a few years 
he and his partner were making 80¥ per day—a very high 
income at that time—transporting sand from a riverbed to 
construction sites in Shigatse. Many villagers bought tractors 
once they saw how much he was earning. For example, 
Sangpo sold a yak and borrowed money from a relative 
to buy a tractor in the 1990s for 7,500¥. After learning to 
drive it at a construction site in Gyantse, he decided to try 
his luck in Lhasa using it to transport pilgrims. This proved 
profitable and in a few months he had made enough money 
to repay most of his loans.  But then, according to Sangpo, the 
government began to crack down:
Minibus drivers were critical of us small tractor 
drivers. They went to the Transportation 
Management Office and said, “We pay taxes 
but the small tractor drivers don’t. If you 
don’t prevent them from moving people about 
then we’ll stop paying taxes.” Since then, the 
authorities took the situation seriously. Before, 
they didn’t prevent us from moving people. We 
had a good business, but then weren’t permitted 
to do it anymore. . . . Then there was a tea house 
being built that needed materials. Through other 
drivers I came to know the boss so I started to 
move earth . . .  If you work hard you can move 
five or six loads in a day, and can earn about 25¥ 
per load.
Nowadays there is more competition. There 
are more people like me earning money in the 
city. In past years, the boss asked me to move 
sand. Now I have to ask the boss if he has sand 
to move.
Despite the increase in competition, people are still 
finding tractor driving more lucrative than manual labor. For 
example, Rinchen recently found a job at a construction site 
in Lhasa. He recalls,
While working [as a manual laborer] I saw 
that others were using small tractors to make 
money. I rushed home, borrowed some money, 
returned to Lhasa and bought a small tractor 
[for 12,000¥]. I worked one month and 20 days 
and earned 7,000¥ by moving loads.
Had he worked as a laborer at 25¥ per day, Rinchen would 
have earned only 1,250¥. However, he still needs to repay the 
tractor loan so his increased income comes with financial risk. 
Around 1995 dump trucks began to supplant tractors in 
the construction industry. Dump trucks have the advantages 
of speed, larger payloads, and less labor because nobody 
needs to unload them. Soon, tractor drivers found it difficult 
to compete with truck drivers for jobs. Recognizing this, 
Migmar (the above-mentioned tractor owner) bought a truck 
in 1997 for 75,000¥. By doing so, and training his son to 
drive it, the family increased its income considerably. Driving 
the truck at construction sites brought the household 70,000¥ 
in 2005, boosting their total income for that year to 87,400¥, 
or more than double Betsag’s average. 
Village Year own a vehicle own a small tractor
Sogang
1997 0.0 10.0
2006 3.3 55.4
Norgyong
1997 9.1 22.9
2006 23.6 67.4
Betsag 2006 27.6 86.7
Table 3: Percentage of households owning vehicles and small tractors. Source: 
Goldstein, Childs, and Wangdui 2008.
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some bribes, 4,000-5,000¥. After paying that I 
didn’t have to pay for the license.
Dawa’s contracts are awarded by various government 
agencies. When a project is announced the agency solicits 
bids, then decides who will get the contract. In 2005 Dawa 
and his two sons had a net income of 280,000¥ from the 
contracting business, which is more than ten times Norgyong’s 
average household income of 24,112¥. 
The purchasing of tractors and trucks qualifies as an 
entrepreneurial activity because rural Tibetans are taking 
financial risks and acting as independent suppliers of services 
in a quest to make profits. Despite numerous success stories, 
every village has examples of people who have not succeeded 
to the level of their expectations. For example, Norbu is an 
elderly man who laments the rusting truck that sits idle in the 
family’s yard. He bought the truck in 2000 expecting his son 
to earn income at construction sites. According to Norbu’s 
son,
The first time I drove the truck was to Gyantse in 
2000. I didn’t know how to drive. It was a new 
truck, so we hired a teacher. The profit for three 
months work was 2,400¥. When I returned my 
father said sarcastically, “Such big money! That 
can’t even cover the salary of the teacher.” These 
days our truck cannot make money. Gas prices 
are high, and the government taxes trucks a lot. 
I want to sell the truck, borrow some money and 
buy a bigger one. But my father doesn’t agree.
Norbu, who openly refers to his son as “the incompetent 
head of my household”, is reluctant to risk more capital on a 
truck. After all, the family already squandered 78,000¥ on a 
vehicle that his son failed to convert into a reliable source of 
income. 
Competition and Shifting Trends
Because successes outnumber failures, villagers continue 
to invest in vehicles as a proven method to increase their 
household incomes. Nevertheless, several vehicle owners 
expressed wariness about competition in the construction 
industry, and see transportation as a more viable long-term 
option. One truck owner summarized this position by saying, 
“I think that moving people will be better in the future. Jobs 
moving earth and stone are difficult to find.” He plans to buy 
a minibus in a year or two. Another man who earns income 
by driving his tractor to distant construction sites thinks he 
cannot raise the 250,000¥ in capital to buy a large dump 
truck. Instead, he plans to save 24,000¥ and then take a bank 
loan of 16,000¥ to buy a minibus.
 Lhawang, who lives in Sogang with his wife and three 
children could not support his family on their limited land so 
he bought a small tractor and drove it to Shigatse in search of 
work. With his earnings and a loan from a relative, he bought 
Table 3 documents the rising percentages of households 
that own vehicles (mainly trucks) and small tractors. Tractors 
provide dual functions as construction transportation 
vehicles and agricultural machinery, whereas trucks are used 
specifically to earn income at construction sites. The most 
recent trend has truck owners selling older, smaller trucks 
to buy larger vehicles in response to equipment changes and 
increasing competition. For example, Namgyal sold an older 
truck for 65,000¥. He used this cash and a bank loan to buy 
a larger truck for 230,000¥. He reasoned,
It’s easier to get jobs with a big truck. 
Backhoe drivers prefer to load bigger trucks. 
Also, sometimes the road is bad or steep at 
construction sites. Small trucks can’t climb up, 
but big trucks have more power. Furthermore, if 
you don’t get a job at a project site, then you can 
transport loads of cement or other goods. Big 
trucks can carry more.
To repay the loan, Namgyal went to Ngari (Western Tibet) 
to work on a government road building project. He traveled 
with an assistant who received 1,000¥ in monthly salary, plus 
learned how to drive. Namgyal transported beer and other 
goods to sell near the construction site to offset costs incurred 
by the long drive.
At the remote construction site drivers were housed in 
tents provided by the Han contractor. Each tent’s residents 
pooled tsampa, flour, and cooking fuel, and contributed 
cash to a common pot to buy vegetables, rice, and meat. 
They transported loads of earth and stone from 8:00 a.m. 
to 8:00 p.m. with a one-hour lunch break. Every time a 
driver delivered a load he was issued a ticket which he later 
redeemed for cash. Through Namgyal’s work, his household’s 
income of 176,309¥ was roughly five times Betsag’s average. 
Some households are now making large-scale investments 
in trucks and construction equipment in an effort to secure 
government contracts. For example, Dawa and his two adult 
sons formed a construction company that specializes in 
building roads. He owns cement mixers, trucks, and earth 
moving vehicles, and has three full-time employees. The 
government recently awarded Dawa a contract to build a 
stretch of road. When we asked Dawa how he got started in 
the business, he responded,
In the past I was doing jobs such as masonry. 
Then I bought a small truck that I drove for 
income. Afterwards I bought another small 
truck, then a bigger truck. Gradually I realized 
that I could organize construction jobs, so in 
2004 I got a government license for a company. 
I couldn’t get the license directly, but had to find 
somebody I had a relationship with to process 
it. I proceeded slowly, found a relationship, and 
then eventually got the license. I had to pay 
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a minibus in 2003. Lhawang set his route from the highest 
village in the valley to Panam, the district headquarters. He 
charged 11¥ per passenger including luggage. On a bad day 
he would barely cover petrol costs, but on a good day he 
could net 300¥. However, Lhawang had to pay several taxes 
amounting to more than 20,000¥ per year. Furthermore, 
he could only afford dilapidated vehicles which the police 
sometimes confiscated for safety reasons. They even forced 
him to sell one bus for scrap metal because it was in such poor 
condition. Despite such persistent obstacles, Lhawang’s 2005 
income of 37,000¥ was considerably higher than Sogang’s 
average household income of 10,332¥.
By 2009 Lhawang had sold the last of his minibuses for 
27,000¥ to a man living further up the valley, and bought a 
used pick-up truck for 46,000¥. According to him, minibuses 
weren’t as convenient to operate because they were subject to 
too many regulations. He explained, 
The minibus was a problem. The police check it 
often, and there are many regulations. You can 
only work one line and can’t go elsewhere. That 
limited my earnings, so I sold the bus. Now I 
have a pick-up truck and am more flexible. I can 
go where I want [to pick up riders] and when 
the police check I say, “These are my relatives.” 
My income is fairly similar to when I had the 
minibus, but work is much easier now. I charge 
5¥ per passenger from here to Panam and can 
get 8-10 passengers per trip. There are not many 
seats, so I just squeeze them in.
Now that Lhawang has a mobile phone clients can 
contact him from afar to book trips. His schedule and routes 
are flexible, and on average he makes 200¥ per day which 
more than covers his costs that include gas, repairs, taxes, 
insurance, and an annual inspection fee. Once he has earned 
enough money, Lhawang plans to buy a better vehicle and 
continue with this business. 
RETAIL BUSINESS AND COTTAGE INDUSTRIES
Pemba of Norgyong is a rural entrepreneur who has 
succeeded in the retail business. In 1984, when he was 19 
years old, he saw a television program featuring people in 
Lhasa who were opening retail stores. This inspired Pemba to 
set off on his own venture. He recalls,
I borrowed 200¥ from the bank. That was a 
large sum of money back then. I was worried 
about losing it on the trip to Lhasa so I stuffed 
it into my underwear. I have an elder sister in 
Lhasa. She said, “You can’t do business with 
200¥.” She gave me another 800¥. 
I went to the market to buy clothing. I found 
some new army jackets for wholesale. Each cost 
5¥. I thought they were good and the price 
seemed cheap, so I spent 100¥ on those. Selling 
them back home I could get 10¥ or sometimes 
even 15¥.
I bought a bicycle and a cart and rode from 
one village to another to sell the clothing. Later 
I bought a donkey, made a cart and went selling 
from one village to the next. I would exchange 
clothing for cash or barley, and then resell the 
barley. I opened my first shop 16 years ago 
[1990]. At first I was amazed to be making a 
profit of 2,000¥ in a year. At that time a laborer 
would make 1-2¥ per day.
There are more stores nowadays. Selling 
used to be easy. You just set a price and went 
to the villages. In the past everybody worried 
that they would not have a chance to buy, 
whereas now you need to encourage people to 
buy. Profits are decreasing because locals have 
opened more shops, and Chinese are coming 
here to sell goods so it is very difficult. 
Pemba’s business nets 37,000¥ in income for the family 
in a village where the average household income is 24,112¥. 
However, after 22 years in the retail clothing business, Pemba 
is shifting his capital into other ventures such as a commercial 
apple orchard and an outdoor leisure park where tourists and 
local officials can have picnics, drink beer, and play games. 
In the meantime, Pemba is training his daughter to take over 
management of his retail business.
Weaving has always been a highly valued skill among 
women in rural Tibet. Nowadays, some women are using this 
skill to generate income for their households. For example, 
Pentok from Sogang reported that, because her family has few 
fields, she has free time to weave coarse woolen cloth (snam 
bu) and fine woolen cloth (shad ma) for clothing. Pentok 
is recognized locally for her exceptional skill, so she takes 
orders from other households in the village. Depending on 
her family’s needs, she barters some products for food and 
sells others for cash. She recently scaled production upward 
because her brother who works in distant Nagchu found 
a market for her goods, prompting Pentok to hire a local 
woman on a part-time basis to help fulfill orders. Pentok’s 
home-based weaving industry nets a profit of 7,000¥ per year, 
which helps boost her household’s annual income to more 
than double Sogang’s average.
Whereas Pentok is a small-scale, village-based 
entrepreneur, two women in Norgyong are creating much 
larger operations. Nyima produces woolen carpets, aprons, 
and bolts of fine woolen cloth. She turned to business after 
bad relations in her polyandrous marriage forced her to 
establish an independent household. As an impoverished 
divorcee raising a disabled daughter, she got a bank loan to 
open a restaurant in Penam. Nyima ran that for three years, 
and in the meantime began making money by weaving. 
According to Nyima, 
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By 2009 Chogpa had a thriving business. She received 
support from local government leaders, and from various 
public and private offices such as the TAR Women’s Federation 
and Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund. All of her 45 female 
weavers are recruited from poor families. When we asked 
why she employs impoverished women, Chogpa responded,
On the one hand I’m practicing what the lama 
said. On the other hand, all levels of government 
now encourage the rich to help the poor, so I’m 
following that policy. I’ve been born into this 
world, and in the future I will die. I want to set 
a good example for others. After I die I want the 
poor people who received my assistance to say, 
“She was good. She helped the poor a lot.”
With net profits ranging between 500,000¥ and 600,000¥ 
annually, Chogpa’s income is twenty times higher than the 
average household income in Norgyong. At the time of our 
last visit in July, 2009, she had nearly completed construction 
on a large factory complex. 
A NEW ECONOMIC ELITE?
Table 4 compares household incomes of selected 
entrepreneurs with average household incomes in the villages 
where they live. Although there is considerable range in the 
amount of income that entrepreneurs generate, they tend 
to make more money than those who only farm and work 
for wages. Even the relatively small-scale entrepreneurial 
households rank in the top tier of household incomes. Tibetan 
entrepreneurs, like their counterparts elsewhere in China, are 
emerging as new economic elites in the countryside.
Although the rapid rise of entrepreneurial opportunities 
may be contributing to a widening income gap in Tibetan 
villages, rural entrepreneurs can mitigate the situation by 
employing people from poorer households. Nyima and 
Chogpa, the weaving business owners described above, both 
spoke about employment as a means to assist impoverished 
women. Although no village-based contractors we interviewed 
mentioned selecting employees from poor households, those 
we interviewed hire the vast majority of their workforce 
locally and tend to employ a mix of friends and relatives. The 
rise of rural entrepreneurs is therefore affecting local hiring 
practices, and if the trend continues then more Tibetans are 
likely to work under Tibetan bosses in the future.   
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSITION IN RURAL 
TIBET
In this paper we have documented the emergence of 
rural Tibetan entrepreneurs who are finding opportunities 
to make money through farm-based initiatives, construction 
contracting, vehicle ownership, cottage industries, and 
retail business. The fact that so many people are pursuing 
entrepreneurial activities in rural Tibet contradicts the “trope 
of indolence” idiom in development discourse and state 
Because we [initially] had no bedding in my 
house, I bought some wool to make some. 
There was leftover wool, so I thought, “I can 
make carpets and earn some money.” I made 
some carpets and sold them to acquaintances. 
They didn’t refuse to buy them; I was poor so 
they had sympathy. I slowly realized that I could 
make money this way, so I sold more carpets 
to acquaintance. They liked to buy them. Now 
I have two carpet looms and six looms for 
producing fine woolen cloth.
Nyima hires workers and provides a loom and raw 
materials so they can weave in their own homes on a contract 
basis. Mainly through word of mouth, demand for Nyima’s 
products has risen. She sells some carpets and bolts of cloth 
locally, but has also found a market in Lhasa. She explained,
I’m a person who knows how to weave and 
who therefore maintains high quality control. 
Because my products are high quality, more and 
more people are asking me to make cloth for 
them. Last year, before Losar (the Tibetan New 
Year), I had so many orders that I couldn’t fill 
them on time. If I had more money to invest, I 
could earn more.
In 2006 Nyima earned a net profit of 50,000¥, which is 
double Norgyong’s average household income of 24,112¥. 
By consistently repaying bank loans her solid credit rating 
provides access to more capital. Importantly, Nyima envisions 
herself as a provider of opportunities for other women. She 
prefers to employ women from poorer households, including 
divorcees like her who need to make an independent living. 
Chogpa is even further along in expanding her handicraft 
business. Born into a household that traditionally specialized 
in the production of woolen cloth, she learned to weave at a 
young age. Around 1995 Chogpa was in her 30s, unmarried, 
and living in her parents’ home. She asked a local lama to 
ordain her as a nun. The lama advised that she was too old 
to become a nun, but instead could practice compassion by 
assisting poor people. Chogpa took this as her life’s mission 
and invested savings to start a small weaving business with six 
employees. She explained,
In the beginning it was hard to sell my products. 
I’d go to a festival in Shigatse and sell items 
on the street. I would walk from Gyantse to 
Shigatse. Each night I’d ask for a place to stay 
in someone’s home, and would sell items. 
Gradually many people came to know me, and 
trusted my quality. They placed orders. I moved 
to Penam in 2004 and set up a factory.
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ideology which assumes that Tibetans lag behind the rest 
of China because they lack the motivation and work ethic 
to uplift their standard of living (Yeh 2007). Nevertheless, 
Fischer (2005) and Wang (2009) have both highlighted real 
and persistent obstacles that inter-ethnic competition poses 
for Tibetans who wish to work in cities. Their research findings 
beg the question: Can Tibetan entrepreneurs compete with 
non-Tibetan entrepreneurs in today’s economy? This question 
is especially pertinent in Tibet because, unlike eastern China 
where people of similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds 
comprise the pool of competitors, Tibetan entrepreneurs 
operate in an environment where they must contend with 
non-Tibetans who have more business experience, better 
education, speak better Chinese, have a better understanding 
of China’s business culture, and have more connections to 
political and economic elites. To a certain degree the situation 
is mitigated by the fact that many rural Tibetans are finding 
their entrepreneurial niches not in cities, but in other rural 
areas where they do not face as much competition with non-
Tibetans.
In some niche industries, like woolen garment production, 
being Tibetan may have an advantage because ethnicity is 
closely associated with the manufactured products (e.g., 
woolen clothing, aprons, etc). On the other hand, Tibetan 
ethnicity probably has no competitive advantage in the 
construction industry. Village leaders informed us that the 
government typically awards large contracts to Han-owned 
companies, presumably because they have more capital, 
machinery, and expertise than locally-owned companies. 
Local companies, at best, are awarded sub-contracts for 
portions of a project. According to one Tibetan contractor, 
even at the sub-contract level he must compete with small, 
Han-owned companies. Sometimes he wins the contracts, 
other times he loses. But in his opinion, local cadres give some 
preference to Tibetan contractors who have good equipment 
and a solid track record. Despite competition from outsiders, 
many Tibetans are investing in heavy equipment with the 
hope of finding a space in Tibet’s booming construction 
industry. In 2006 we knew of six households in Betsag 
and three in Norgyong that had established constructing 
contracting businesses. As Tibetans gain more experience 
and capital, the number of Tibetan-owned and operated 
contracting companies is likely to increase, and Tibetans are 
likely to capture a larger proportion of lower-end construction 
contracts throughout Tibet.
The future prosperity of rural Tibet is closely linked to 
government policies because so much of Tibet’s current 
economic climate is driven by government expenditures 
(Fischer 2009, see also Fischer this volume). In fact, the 
upsurge of entrepreneurial activities we documented is linked 
to the Develop the West Campaign, and some niches (e.g., 
house construction contractors) are directly related to the 
Comfortable Housing Program. Furthermore, the government 
facilitates entrepreneurial opportunities by providing 
relatively easy access to capital in the form of bank loans and 
government grants. This does not mean that rural Tibetan 
entrepreneurs are dependent on the government for success, 
or that entrepreneurs have only arisen because of the Develop 
the West Campaign. Prior to 2000 some people in our research 
area were starting enterprises, and non-farm work was 
already becoming more 
important as a household 
economic diversification 
strategy. However, what 
differs today is that more 
people are able to make or 
borrow money, and with 
the increase of economic 
activity throughout Tibet 
more people are finding 
entrepreneurial niches 
and taking financial risks 
in the hope of enhancing 
their household incomes. 
While some business 
ventures will no doubt 
fail—and some already 
have—it is evident 
that an entrepreneurial 
transition is underway. 
But because the 
entrepreneurial transition 
is highly dependent 
on the government’s 
development policy, it is 
Enterprise Village
2005 HH Income 
(¥)
% Diff. from Mean*
HH Income’s Rank 
(HHs)
Ngödrup, Brick 
Production Betsag 39,895 11.6 30 (93)
Pasang, Pig/Sheep 
Farm Norgyong 36,002 49.3 22 (124)
Pemba, Retail 
Business Norgyong 40,353 67.4 18 (124)
Nyima, Weaving 
Factory Norgyong 40,400 67.6 17 (124)
Khangchen, Cheese 
Factory Betsag 61,138 71.0 20 (93)
Gyaltsen, Small 
Contractor Sogang 19,627 90.0 8 (92)
Pentok, Home 
Weaver Sogang 22,500 117.8 7 (92)
Migmar, Truck 
Owner/Operator Betsag 88,149 146.5 4 (93)
Lhawang, Minibus 
Owner/Operator Sogang 38,500 272.6 4( 92)
Namgyal, Truck 
Owner/Operator Betsag 176,309 393.0 1 (93)
Dawa, Contracting 
Business Norgyong 280,000 1,061.2 2 (124)
Table 4: Rural Entrepreneurs and Household Incomes. 
* 2005 mean household incomes were 35,759¥ in Betsag, 24,112¥ in Norgyong, and 10,332¥ in Sogang. Source: Goldstein, 
Childs, and Wangdui 2008.
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unclear whether the momentum we witnessed from 1997 to 
2009 is sustainable over the long-term, and if so, how it will 
transform social, political, and cultural life in the countryside.
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